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Abstract
An important direction in computational mecha-
nism design is to characterize the space of choice
functions that can be truthfully implemented. For
this, one must carefully describe the class of pref-
erences in a domain. For unrestricted preferences
the domain is well-characterized, and small. More-
over, recent work [Lavi et al., 2003] has allowed for
“order-based” preferences but found essentially the
same (negative) characterization. However, most
interesting domains have preferences that are still
more structured than those allowed in the order-
based model. We highlight this issue in our pa-
per, through many examples, thus demonstrating
the limited applicability of this result. We propose
extensions to the model of order-based domains
to capture new preference structure, and conjec-
ture that more positive characterizations for truth-
fulness are possible. We also advocate, in propos-
ing a research direction for sufﬁcient conditions for
truthfulness, that attention be restricted to natural
(critical-value based) payment functions.
1 Introduction
In a mechanism, a center chooses between a number of out-
comes or alternatives. The choice is made based on reports
(not necessarily sincere) of preferences (also called types)
from selﬁsh agents. The center then decides how much the
agents should pay given the outcome and their reported pref-
erences. A simple example of a mechanism is an auction
where agents submit bids and the auctioneer decides how to
allocate goods and ﬁxes payments.
Mechanism design is concerned with designing social
choice functions (scfs) that satisfy certain desirable proper-
ties. A central property is truthfulness: a mechanism is truth-
ful if it is a dominant strategy for agents to declare their true
types. We say that the choice function f is truthful if there
exists some payment scheme p that together with f deﬁnes a
truthful mechanism. A central question, recently revisited in
Lavi et al. [2003] is to characterize the truthful choice func-
tions.
There has been a surge of interest in mechanism design,
motivated in part by an increasing number of computer sci-
ence applications in which participants are self interested,
with distributed systems more often the norm than the excep-
tion and with the continued automation of commerce. When
characterizing the truthful choice functions it is important to
carefully deﬁne the preference space because this affects the
results. Loosely, the more structured the space of preferences,
the more positive the characterization. For completely uncon-
strained preferences, Roberts [1979] showed that the truthful
functions are exactly the afﬁne-maximizer (AM) functions.
This can be understood as a negative result, because it identi-
ﬁes the class of well-known Groves mechanisms as the only
truthful mechanisms for unrestricted preferences.
Lavi et al. [2003] recognized an important shortcoming
with Robert’s result, noting that many preferences are known
to be structured in many interesting domains. In their words,
the assumption of unrestricted domains is not without restric-
tion. In response, the authors consider the family of order-
based (OB) domains. OB domains are signiﬁcant because
they allow one to state restrictions on preferences such as
free-disposal, and no-externalities which are the hallmark of
many classic preference models. As such, OB domains are
able to capture the preference structure of combinatorial auc-
tions. However, despite this new ability to capture preference
structure, Lavi et al. [2003] recovered essentially the same
negative result as Roberts [1979], at least for the case where
the scf satisﬁes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
property.
In this paper, we highlight many examples with more pref-
erence structure than the OB domains, thus demonstrating the
limited applicability of the results in Lavi et al. [2003]. The
negative result is not as powerful as it ﬁrst seems. We ar-
gue that the assumption of OB domains is not without re-
striction, and look to minimal and modular extensions to the
order-based description language that can capture our coun-
terexamples. This provides motivation to look for alternate
characterizations of preference domains, and for positive (i.e.
non afﬁne-maximizer) results. In addition, we argue for two
additional properties of a useful characterization: that of nat-
ural payment functions, and universal applicability. We re-
turn to these requirements in Subsection 3.1.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that there are n agents, a ﬁnite range of alterna-
tives A (jAj = m), and a domain of preferences (valuationsPrefs
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Figure 1: Illustration of the inclusion relations between subclasses
of WMON functions on various domains. WMON is equivalent to
truthful for order-based or convex domains. First example in Section
7 of the [Saks and Yu, 2005] provides a function that is WMON
but not truthful for a non-convex domain. Roberts’ result ([Roberts,
1979]) states that only AM are truthful for the domain of general
valuations. For single-minded preferences, [Lehmann et al., 2002]
shows that monotonicity is equivalent to truthfulness and thus the
class of truthful functions is richer than the class of AM.
over alternatives), V = V1  :::  Vn, where each agent i
has some (private) valuation vi 2 Vi such that vi : A ! R.
We can regard any vi 2 Vi as a vector in Rm with a com-
ponent for each alternative. For v 2 V and 1  i  n we
denote v i = (v1;:::;vi 1;vi+1;:::;vn). Similarly, we de-
note V i = V1  :::  Vi 1  Vi+1  :::  Vn.
A mechanism consists of a choice function f : V ! A and
payments p = (p1;:::;pn) where pi = pi(v;f(v)) : V 
A ! R. Agents are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities,
i.e. if any agent j has true type vj and reports type v0
j then,
letting v0 = (v0
1;:::;v0
n), the utility for agent i is given by
ui(vi;f(v0)) = vi(f(v0))   pi(v0;f(v0)) (1)
The following is a formal deﬁnition of truthfulness in a
dominant strategy equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 Mechanism (f;p) is truthful if every agent i
maximizes its utility by truthfully reporting its type vi:
ui(vi;f(vi;v0
 i))  ui(vi;f(v0
i;v0
 i)) 8v0
i 2 Vi (2)
for all reports v0
 i 2 V i from the other agents.
If the mechanism is viewed as a game with the agents as
players, then a mechanism is truthful if and only if it is a
dominant strategy for the players to bid truthfully.
3 Preference-Based Characterizations of
Truthfulness
In this section, we will review some of the recent papers char-
acterizing truthfulness and draw some connections between
them. Figure1servestoillustratethissection. First, itiswell-
known [Rochet, 1987] that a monotonicity property (known
as weak-monotonicity) is necessary for truthfulness, whatever
the preference domain.
Deﬁnition 2 The social choice function f satisﬁes weak
monotonicity WMON if 8i;8v i 2 V i, 8ui;vi 2 Vi
f(vi;v i) = a
f(ui;v i) = b

)ui(b)   vi(b)  ui(a)   vi(a) (3)
That is, if the outcome chosen by f changes from a to b
and only agent i has changed its report, from vi to ui, then
it must be that the relative increase in value is weakly higher
for the new outcome b than for the old outcome a.
In Figure 1, we draw the outer-cone to illustrate the space
of WMON functions. For unrestricted domains, WMON is
also sufﬁcient for truthfulness.1 Seemingly positive, this re-
sult which says that all WMON functions are truthful for un-
restricted preferences, turns negative when one realizes that
the space of WMON functions is exactly that of afﬁne max-
imizers for unrestricted preferences. This is not so for other
preference domains.
Deﬁnition 3 f is an afﬁne maximizer if 8a 2 A 9a 2 R
and 8i 9wi 2 R such that
f(v) 2 argmax
a2A
(
n X
i=1
wivi(a) + a
)
(4)
The afﬁne maximizers are illustrated in Figure 1 through
the central (cylindrical) volume. So, for general preferences
(to the left) we have this volume taking all of the size of
the outer WMON cone. Moreover, notice that the class
of Groves mechanisms (e.g. via the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) payment scheme), provide truthful payments for all
afﬁne maximizers. On the other hand, Lehmann et al. [2002]
had demonstrated that while WMON was also sufﬁcient for
single-minded bidders (see Section 4), the class of WMON
functions included non afﬁne-maximizers for that preference
domain. Thus, the WMON outer-cone is larger than the AM
cylinder for single-minded preferences (to the right).
Lavi et al. [2003] considers a model that allows for some
structure to preferences. This is the class of order-based (OB)
domains:
Deﬁnition 4 A domain Vi is order-based (OB) if it is deﬁned
by a set C of (in)equalities of the form vi(a) f<;;=g vi(b)
or vi(a) = 0 where a;b 2 A. That is, all vi 2 Vi and only
them satisfy the (in)equalities in C. A domain V = V1:::
Vn is order-based if each Vi is order-based.
We provide many examples of using the OB model in the
later sections in the paper. For now, just note that the do-
main of unrestricted domains is trivially OB by using no
constraints, i.e. C = ;. Lavi et al. [2003] establish that
WMON remains sufﬁcient for truthfulness in OB domains.
Recently, Saks and Yu [2005] extend this result and estab-
lish that WMON also remains sufﬁcient for truthfulness in
the more expressive class of convex domains. A domain is
1This is a corollary of the sufﬁciency of WMON in order-based
domains [Lavi et al., 2003].convex if for any vi;v0
i 2 Vi then vi + (1   )v0
i 2 Vi for
 2 [0;1]. The following is immediate:
Proposition 1 Any order-based domain Vi is convex.
The converse implication is not true: it can be shown that
the domain of linear threshold preferences (Subsection 5.2)
is convex but not order-based.
Again, we should not view this sufﬁciency of WMON for
order-based as a positive result because (in their main result)
Lavi et al. [2003] establish that the WMON functions remain
essentially equivalent to the afﬁne maximizer functions for
OB domains. We also note that Gui et al. [2004] adopt a
graph-theoretic approach to truthfulness and establish a num-
ber of preference domains for which WMON is sufﬁcient for
truthfulness, some of which are not order-based. However,
neither them nor Saks and Yu [2005] consider how this class
relates to the afﬁne-maximizers.
Some of the preference domains that we consider lie out-
sideoforder-basedandconvexdomains(seeFigures1and2).
It is in these (important) domains that new characterization
results are required.
3.1 Properties Beyond Truthfulness
In proposing a research direction to characterize sufﬁcient
conditions for truthfulness in more structured domains, we
also advocate looking for conditions that provide the follow-
ing two additional properties:
 Natural payments. We would prefer a characterization of
truthful functions that are supported with a natural payment
function. We favor the “critical value” payment function that
generalizes the VCG payment for non afﬁne-maximizer func-
tions. In particular, for outcome a = f(v), denote payment
function:
pi(v;a) = min
v0
i2Vi
v0
i(a) (5)
s:t: f(v0
i;v i) 2 Ei(a)
where Ei(a)  A is the set of alternatives for which agent
i is indifferent between that alternative and a, given its val-
uation. It is not hard to show that this is precisely the VCG
payment rule for the case that f is an afﬁne maximizer. More-
over, this is precisely the payment rule in the auction fam-
ily of Lehmann et al. [2002] for single-minded preferences.
Yokoo [2003] also states the importance of critical-value pay-
ment functions.
Most of the recent characterizations that we reviewed fail
to satisfy this desideratum.
 Universal applicability. We would prefer a characteriza-
tion that is universal for some large class of structured pref-
erences. Here, we draw an analogy with the Groves mecha-
nisms. Groves mechanisms are “universal” in that they apply
whatever the preference domain. This universal applicability
is surely one reason for their appeal. While recognizing that
new characterizations require new structural assumptions, we
wish to identify requirements that are both minimal and easy
to interpret and apply.
4 Combinatorial Auctions with Structure
In the following two sections we investigate whether several
examples of preference domains are order-based and thus il-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Convex
Domains
based
order−
Exist−
domains
domains
based
Order−
Arrival/
Departure Single
Minded
General
Prefs
CA Prefs
Complement−
free prefs
Thresh
Linear
Contiguous
Envious
Additive
Figure 2: Domain classes and example domains.
lustrate where the negative afﬁne-maximizer result does not
hold. In Section 6 we propose extensions to the notion of
order-based domains that capture our negative examples. Fig-
ure 2 provides an overview of most of our results.
We ﬁrst consider domains of preferences in combinatorial
auctions (CAs) but with additional preference structure. In a
CA,theauctioneerhask differentitemstoselltothenagents.
An alternative a = (a1;:::;an) in a CA is an allocation of
the goods auctioned with agent i getting bundle ai such that
the ai’s are disjoint. The domain of CA preferences is order-
based, being deﬁned by the set of inequalities CCA described
below:
 Free disposal. (“if I am allocated extra items then my
value does not go down”): vi(a)  vi(b), 8a;b 2 A s.t.
ai  bi
 No externalities. (“I only care about my own bundle”):
vi(a) = vi(b), 8a;b 2 A s.t. ai = bi
 Normalization. (“getting nothing has value 0 for me”):
vi(a) = 0, 8a 2 A s.t. ai = ;
In the CA setting, a very restricted preference domain is
the one of single-minded bidders, where agents only care if
they get a certain set of items, the others being irrelevant.
Deﬁnition 5 A bidder is single-minded if there exist w 2 R
and a “magic bundle” S such that
vi(a) =

w if S  ai
0 otherwise 8a 2 A
If jSj = 1 then we call this preference the Unknown-Item-
Unknown-Value (UIUV).
Note that all single-minded preferences certainly satisfy
the constraints in CCA. However, the domain of single-
minded preferences is not order-based.2
In fact, we prove the following stronger result, which pro-
vides a powerful tool for many of our negative examples:
Proposition 2 Let Vi be a preference domain that satisﬁes
the constraints in CCA, contains all UIUV preferences but
2It is also simple to see that the domain of single-minded prefer-
ences is not convex. Note that the domain of known single-minded
preferences (where the magic bundle is known beforehand) is order-
based.does not contain all possible CA preferences. Then Vi can
not be order-based.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that Vi was order-based
and let C be the set of constraints that deﬁnes it. Then C must
contain all constraints for CAs CCA. However, only these
are not enough as Vi is not the domain of all possible CA
valuations. Thus C must contain at least one inequality of the
form vi(a)f<;;=gvi(b) where ai 6 bi. Assume wlog that
this relation is vi(a)  vi(b). This inequality is not satisﬁed
by any UIUV preference v for item x with x 2 ai n bi that
has value 0 for bundle bi and some positive value for bundle
ai, contradiction. 2
Note that we can replace the domain of UIUV preferences
in the proposition with any domain D with the following
property: for any alternatives a and b there exist valuations
u;v 2 D such that u(a) > u(b) but v(a) < v(b). The key
property in the proof is preserved: no ordering inequality that
holds for all v 2 D can be required for any two alternatives a
and b.
We will be using Proposition 2 extensively. For now, note:
Corollary 1 Single-minded preferences are not order-based.
Also, note that if some preference domain D1 is not order-
based and UIUV  D2  D1, then D2 is not order-based.
4.1 Bounded XOR and Unit-Demand Preferences
Let the class of “bounded XOR preferences” denote valu-
ations vi 2 Vi for which there is some set of bundles X,
jXj < 2n, for which vi(S) = maxS02X vi(S0) for all bun-
dles S. Note that this class assumes knowledge that no bid-
der needs to express a value for every possible bundle. Thus,
some valuations, e.g. any valuation that associates a different
value for each bundle, can not be expressed in this domain.
We also have the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 2 Bounded XOR preferences are not order-based.
It also follows as an immediate corollary that unit-demand
preferences are not order-based.
4.2 Complement-Free Preferences
Again in a CA setting, consider the domain of complement-
free preferences, i.e. preferences that do not have any com-
plementarity relation between bundles (see [Lehmann et al.,
2001] for a characterization of this domain):
vi(ai) + vi(bi)  vi(ai [ bi) 8ai \ bi = ; (6)
The domain of complement-free preferences is not order-
based as it contains all UIUV preferences and Proposition 2
applies.
4.3 Additive preferences
Avaluationvi isadditive(OR)ifthereexistanumberk andk
“atoms” (bundles) B(1);:::;B(k) with values s(1);:::;s(k)
such that the value of any bundle ai is the value of the maxi-
mum packing of the atoms in ai (or 0 if no atom is included in
ai). 3 The domain of additive preferences is not order-based
3Formally, the evaluation function for an agent i and an alloca-
tion a 2 A is: vi(a) equals 0 if B
(h) 6 ai, 81  h  k, or
max
Pr
j=1 s
(hj) over all decompositions B
(h1)[[B
(hr)  ai
of disjoint atoms B
(hj)’s otherwise.
because it contains all UIUV preferences but is not fully ex-
pressive, and thus Proposition 2 applies.
Corollary 3 Additive preferences are not order-based.
4.4 Contiguous preferences
Consider a setting where ordered items are auctioned (for ex-
ample CPU time shares on a single-processor machine). Let
contiguous preferences denote preferences of agents that only
havepositivevalueforacontiguousallocationofresourceson
the machine. Free disposal holds, so that if an agent receives
two sequences then its value is the max of its value for each
individual sequence. However, we will not assume knowl-
edge of any additional structure (such as each agent needs a
particular length of allocation).
Proposition 3 Contiguous preferences are order-based.
Proof. The proof is immediate once one recognizes that
we can redeﬁne the alternative space so that each alternative
a 2 A gives each agent i either no allocation or a contiguous
allocation. Then this is a CA preference domain in this new
alternative space. 2
Note that this result is very brittle. If we now say that
it is also known in the domain that each bidder has an (un-
known beforehand) minimal length of allocation for which it
has value then we lose the order-based property.
4.5 Attribute-Based Preferences
In some domains there is an attribute to goods and this at-
tribute is important in deﬁning a bidder’s valuation. For in-
stance, in online auctions [Lavi and Nisan, 2000], this at-
tribute is time and we can model preferences such as “I have
positive value for outcome t iff t1  t  t2,” (where t1 and
t2 are interpreted as arrival and departure times not known
beforehand). In general, an attribute-based preference is one
where there is some condition gi(a) 2 f0;1g on an alter-
native a 2 A that determines whether or not the agent has
value for the alternative (with vi(a) > 0 if and only if gi(a)).
Condition gi is private to each agent (or perhaps it is a pa-
rameterized condition for which the parameters, e.g. t1 and
t2, are unknown to the mechanism).
Proposition 4 Attribute-based preferences are not order-
based.
Proof. Just note that for all a1;a2 2 A we can ﬁnd some
preferences for which gi(a1) = 1 and gi(a2) = 0 and vice
versa. Thus, no order-based inequalities can be put forth for
this domain. As this domain is not the domain of unrestricted
preferences we conclude that it is not order-based. 2
5 Multi-Unit Auctions with Structure
Consider a multi-unit auction (MUA) setting, where k identi-
cal goods are for sale to the n agents. An allocation a here is
deﬁned by a vector of values a1;:::;an where ai represents
thenumberofitemsallocatedtoagentianda1++an  k.
Out of the three axioms for CAs we will just assume normal-
ization (“If I get no items then I have value 0 for this alloca-
tion”).5.1 Envious Preferences
Consider a preference such as: “I have positive value for an
allocation only if my share is the biggest”, i.e. vi(a) > 0 iff
ai  aj 8j 6= i. We call these envious preferences.
Proposition 5 Envious preferences are order-based.
Proof. The set C that deﬁnes this domain contains all in-
equalities of the form:
 vi(a) = 0 iff 9j 6= i s.t. ai < aj
 vi(a) > vi(;) = 0 iff 8j 6= i, ai  aj
2
Free-disposal does not hold for envious preferences: if
there are 3 agents and 20 items agent 1 has positive value
for the allocation vector (8, 7, 5) but zero value for (9, 11,
0). However, one can add “limited” free-disposal to envious
preferences, in the sense that a0
i  ai  aj 8j ) vi(a0
i) 
vi(ai) > 0. Envious preferences with limited free-disposal
remain order-based.
5.2 Linear Threshold preferences
Again, in a multi-unit auction, consider preferences like “I
have positive value for an allocation iff I get at least r items”,
where r is not known beforehand. A more formal deﬁnition
of the domain THR of linear threshold preferences is: vi 2
THR iff 91  r = r(vi)  k s.t. vi(a) = 0 if ai < r and
vi(a) > 0 if ai  r.
The following result shows that linear threshold prefer-
ences are not order-based. The proof uses the fact that all
inequalities for normalization, free-disposal and no externali-
ties should be used in deﬁning this domain and shows that no
other constraint can be added.
Proposition 6 The domain THR is not order-based.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that THR was order-
based, deﬁned by the set of inequalities C. Note ﬁrst that any
linear threshold valuation satisﬁes normalization, free dis-
posalandnoexternalitiessoalltheinequalitiescharacterizing
those properties must be in C. However, those are not sufﬁ-
cient as there are many MUA preferences that are not linear
threshold. Let us analyze what kind of constraints we can add
to the ones already in C.
 Can we add any inequality of the form vi(a) < vi(b) for
some a;b 2 A? Because of free disposal and no exter-
nalities we need ai < bi. The linear threshold valuation
that has value 1 for any allocation that assigns at least
ai items to agent i does not satisfy this inequality, so we
can not add such an inequality.
 Can we add any constraint of the form vi(a) = vi(b) for
ai < bi? No, as any linear threshold valuation with bi as
threshold does not satisfy this constraint.
 
In a similar fashion, we get that we can not add any other
constraints to C. Therefore we can not construct a set of con-
straints that deﬁnes THR, i.e. THR is not order-based. 2
Thus, the negative result does not apply to resource-
allocation settings with this “linear-threshold” structure.
6 Extensions to the Order-Based Model
In this section, we propose some minimal and modular exten-
sions to the OB model that can capture our counterexamples.
We believe that the extensions should form the basis of future
research in truthful characterizations.
6.1 Exist-order-based domains
Some of the examples have illustrated the fact that order-
based domains can not handle the quantiﬁer “9” but are ap-
propriate for enforcing universal linear constraints via the
quantiﬁer “8”. We can extend the notion of order-based do-
mains to include these counterexamples: we allow “there ex-
ists” statements and inequalities that use the outcomes quan-
tiﬁed by the “9” statements. We aim the following notion as
a minimal extension of order-based:
Deﬁnition 6 A domain Vi is exist-order-based if it is deﬁned
by the a set C of constraints of the following form:
Unconstrained: vi(a) f<;;=g vi(b) or vi(a) = 0
where a;b 2 A are ﬁxed.
Constrained Fix k  1, an arbitrary relation R(
k+1
z }| {
;:::;)
and an ordering relation 2 in f<;;>;;=g. Then 8vi 2
Vi there exist reference outcomes a(1);:::, a(k) 2 A (that
may depend on vi) such that:
if R
 
a;a(1);:::;a(k)
then
vi(a) 2 fvi(a(h));vi(b)g or
vi(a) = 0
where a;b 2 A are ﬁxed and h is some index, 1  h  k.
That is, all vi 2 Vi and only them satisfy the constraints in C.
The unconstrained (in)equalities hold unconditionally for
any vi 2 Vi. The constrained (in)equalities allow the choice
of the reference outcomes for each vi 2 Vi, allowing thus
richer structure than order-based domains: in the deﬁnition of
order-based domains only unconstrained (in)equalities are al-
lowed. The relations and the outcomes a;b in the constrained
inequalities are the same across all vi 2 Vi: it is only the ref-
erence outcomes that change from one vi to another. We can
now revisit some of our earlier example domains:
 Linear threshold preferences. We need the constraints for
free-disposal, normalization and no externalities. We have
two sets of reference outcomes: the a(h)’s and b(h)’s are the
allocations where agent i gets r 1 and r items, respectively.
Then the constrained inequalities are:
 any allocation a that gives i exactly r 1 items has value
0: if 9h s.t. a = a(h) then vi(a) = 0.
 any allocation a that gives i exactly r items has value
greater than 0: if 9h s.t. a = b(h) then vi(a) > vi(;) =
0
 free disposal extends the properties above to all alloca-
tions where agent i gets less than r   1 or more than r
items
 Attribute-Based Preferences. As an example, consider the
class of arrival-departure preferences, in which an agent has
positive value for an item received between time t1 and time
t2. Given the exist-order-based model, we can deﬁne tworeference outcomes: t(1) and t(2), representing the agent’s ar-
rival and departure time. Recall that we identify an outcome
with the time t the agent is served. The constrained inequali-
ties are:
 If t(1)  t  t(2) then vi(t) > 0.
 If t < t(1) or t > t(2) then vi(t) = 0.
 Single Minded Bidders. We need all CA unconstrained
inequalities. We only have one reference outcome: some al-
location aS

where agent i gets its magic bundle S. The
constrained inequalities are:
 any allocation a that gives agent i a superset of S has
value equal to s, the value of S to the agent: if aS

i =
S  ai then vi(a) = s
 any allocation a that does not give agent i a superset of
S has value 0: if aS

i = S 6 ai then vi(a) = 0
In a similar fashion it can be shown that attribute-based
preferences or bounded-XOR preferences are exist-order-
based.
6.2 General Bidding Languages
The exist-order-based extension does not help to express
“value” related features of structured domains, such as those
in complement-free domains and with OR preferences.
For complement-free, consider the following extension of
order-based:
Deﬁnition 7 A domain is multi-order-based if it can be de-
ﬁned by a set C of constraints of the form:
 vi(a) = 0
 vi(a(1)) + ::: + vi(a(r)) f<;;=g vi(b(1)) + ::: +
vi(b(s)) for some integers r;s
where the a’s and the b’s are alternatives in A that do not
depend on vi. That is, all vi 2 Vi and only them satisfy the
constraints in C.
In the deﬁnition of order-based domains, we always have
r = s = 1. The domain of complement-free preferences can
be expressed by introducing inequalities of the form Eq. (6)
for all bundles ai and bi, and using the fact that in CAs we
have no externalities: vi(a) = vi(ai). It can be shown that
attribute-based preferences (Subsection 4.5) are not multi-
order-based.
In general, this pushes us in the direction of introducing
features from bidding languages into the descriptive language
for preference domains. For instance, in order to include OR
preferences in the deﬁnition of order-based, one can add a
max packing operator to the syntax of order-based domains
in a similar fashion to the method we used for the “there ex-
ists” quantiﬁer.
This can be done for any other bidding language L: if
agents are restricted to having preferences expressible in L,
thenwecanextend order-basedtocontain thatdomain aswell
by adding L semantics. This is what we did for complement-
freepreferencesandpreferencesthatrelyonthe“thereexists”
quantiﬁer.
7 Conclusions
We have considered the role of structured preferences in the
characterization of truthful mechanisms. Through many ex-
amples, we have suggested that the current (negative) char-
acterizations may not carry forward to realistic domains in
which there can be considerable structure on preferences.
This motivates the need for continued research in the char-
acterization of truthful mechanisms. In this vein, we have
suggested some minimal extensions to the order-based model
due to Lavi et al. [2003], introducing new “there exists” se-
mantics in addition to more expressiveness to constrain the
relative values on alternatives. In closing, we reemphasize
our view that it will be important to seek sufﬁcient conditions
on truthfulness that also provide for the existence of natural
payments and for methods with universal applicability.
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